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Abstract
Despite having high accuracy, neural nets have been shown to be susceptible to
adversarial examples, where a small perturbation to an input can cause it to become
mislabeled. We propose metrics for measuring the robustness of a neural net and
devise a novel algorithm for approximating these metrics based on an encoding of
robustness as a linear program. We show how our metrics can be used to evaluate
the robustness of deep neural nets with experiments on the MNIST and CIFAR-10
datasets. Our algorithm generates more informative estimates of robustness metrics
compared to estimates based on existing algorithms. Furthermore, we show how
existing approaches to improving robustness “overfit” to adversarial examples
generated using a specific algorithm. Finally, we show that our techniques can be
used to additionally improve neural net robustness both according to the metrics
that we propose, but also according to previously proposed metrics.
1 Introduction
Recent work [21] shows that it is often possible to construct an input mislabeled by a neural net
by perturbing a correctly labeled input by a tiny amount in a carefully chosen direction. Lack of
robustness can be problematic in a variety of settings, such as changing camera lens or lighting
conditions, successive frames in a video, or adversarial attacks in security-critical applications [18].
A number of approaches have since been proposed to improve robustness [6, 5, 1, 7, 20]. However,
work in this direction has been handicapped by the lack of objective measures of robustness. A typical
approach to improving the robustness of a neural net f is to use an algorithm A to find adversarial
examples, augment the training set with these examples, and train a new neural net f ′ [5]. Robustness
is then evaluated by using the same algorithm A to find adversarial examples for f ′—if A discovers
fewer adversarial examples for f ′ than for f , then f ′ is concluded to be more robust than f . However,
f ′ may have overfit to adversarial examples generated by A—in particular, a different algorithm A′
may find as many adversarial examples for f ′ as for f . Having an objective robustness measure is
vital not only to reliably compare different algorithms, but also to understand robustness of production
neural nets—e.g., when deploying a login system based on face recognition, a security team may
need to evaluate the risk of an attack using adversarial examples.
In this paper, we study the problem of measuring robustness. We propose to use two statistics of
the robustness ρ(f,x∗) of f at point x∗ (i.e., the L∞ distance from x∗ to the nearest adversarial
example) [21]. The first one measures the frequency with which adversarial examples occur; the
other measures the severity of such adversarial examples. Both statistics depend on a parameter ,
which intuitively specifies the threshold below which adversarial examples should not exist (i.e.,
points x with L∞ distance to x∗ less than  should be assigned the same label as x∗).
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The key challenge is efficiently computing ρ(f,x∗). We give an exact formulation of this problem
as an intractable optimization problem. To recover tractability, we approximate this optimization
problem by constraining the search to a convex region Z(x∗) around x∗. Furthermore, we devise
an iterative approach to solving the resulting linear program that produces an order of magnitude
speed-up. Common neural nets (specifically, those using rectified linear units as activation functions)
are in fact piecewise linear functions [15]; we choose Z(x∗) to be the region around x∗ on which
f is linear. Since the linear nature of neural nets is often the cause of adversarial examples [5], our
choice of Z(x∗) focuses the search where adversarial examples are most likely to exist.
We evaluate our approach on a deep convolutional neural network f for MNIST. We estimate ρ(f,x∗)
using both our algorithm ALP and (as a baseline) the algorithm AL-BFGS introduced by [21]. We show
that ALP produces a substantially more accurate estimate of ρ(f,x∗) than AL-BFGS. We then use data
augmentation with each algorithm to improve the robustness of f , resulting in fine-tuned neural nets
fLP and fL-BFGS. According to AL-BFGS, fL-BFGS is more robust than f , but not according to ALP. In
other words, fL-BFGS overfits to adversarial examples computed using AL-BFGS. In contrast, fLP is
more robust according to both AL-BFGS and ALP. Furthermore, to demonstrate scalability, we apply
our approach to evaluate the robustness of the 23-layer network-in-network (NiN) neural net [13] for
CIFAR-10, and reveal a surprising lack of robustness. We fine-tune NiN and show that robustness
improves, albeit only by a small amount. In summary, our contributions are:
• We formalize the notion of pointwise robustness studied in previous work [5, 21, 6] and
propose two statistics for measuring robustness based on this notion (§2).
• We show how computing pointwise robustness can be encoded as a constraint system
(§3). We approximate this constraint system with a tractable linear program and devise an
optimization for solving this linear program an order of magnitude faster (§4).
• We demonstrate experimentally that our algorithm produces substantially more accurate
measures of robustness compared to algorithms based on previous work, and show evidence
that neural nets fine-tuned to improve robustness (§5) can overfit to adversarial examples
identified by a specific algorithm (§6).
1.1 Related work
The susceptibility of neural nets to adversarial examples was discovered by [21]. Given a test point
x∗ with predicted label `∗, an adversarial example is an input x∗ + r with predicted label ` 6= `∗
where the adversarial perturbation r is small (in L∞ norm). Then, [21] devises an approximate
algorithm for finding the smallest possible adversarial perturbation r. Their approach is to minimize
the combined objective loss(f(x∗ + r), `) + c‖r‖∞, which is an instance of box-constrained convex
optimization that can be solved using L-BFGS-B. The constant c is optimized using line search.
Our formalization of the robustness ρ(f,x∗) of f at x∗ corresponds to the notion in [21] of finding the
minimal ‖r‖∞. We propose an exact algorithm for computing ρ(f,x∗) as well as a tractable approxi-
mation. The algorithm in [21] can also be used to approximate ρ(f,x∗); we show experimentally
that our algorithm is substantially more accurate than [21].
There has been a range of subsequent work studying robustness; [17] devises an algorithm for
finding purely synthetic adversarial examples (i.e., no initial image x∗), [22] searches for adversarial
examples using random perturbations, showing that adversarial examples in fact exist in large regions
of the pixel space, [19] shows that even intermediate layers of neural nets are not robust to adversarial
noise, and [3] seeks to explain why neural nets may generalize well despite poor robustness properties.
Starting with [5], a major focus has been on devising faster algorithms for finding adversarial
examples. Their idea is that adversarial examples can then be computed on-the-fly and used as
training examples, analogous to data augmentation approaches typically used to train neural nets [10].
To find adversarial examples quickly, [5] chooses the adversarial perturbation r to be in the direction
of the signed gradient of loss(f(x∗ + r), `) with fixed magnitude. Intuitively, given only the gradient
of the loss function, this choice of r is most likely to produce an adversarial example with ‖r‖∞ ≤ .
In this direction, [16] improves upon [5] by taking multiple gradient steps, [7] extends this idea to
norms beyond the L∞ norm, [6] takes the approach of [21] but fixes c, and [20] formalizes [5] as
robust optimization.
A key shortcoming of these lines of work is that robustness is typically measured using the same
algorithm used to find adversarial examples, in which case the resulting neural net may have overfit
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to adversarial examples generating using that algorithm. For example, [5] shows improved accuracy
to adversarial examples generated using their own signed gradient method, but do not consider
whether robustness increases for adversarial examples generated using more precise approaches such
as [21]. Similarly, [7] compares accuracy to adversarial examples generated using both itself and [5]
(but not [21]), and [20] only considers accuracy on adversarial examples generated using their own
approach on the baseline network. The aim of our paper is to provide metrics for evaluating robustness,
and to demonstrate the importance of using such impartial measures to compare robustness.
Additionally, there has been work on designing neural network architectures [6] and learning proce-
dures [1] that improve robustness to adversarial perturbations, though they do not obtain state-of-the-
art accuracy on the unperturbed test sets. There has also been work using smoothness regularization
related to [5] to train neural nets, focusing on improving accuracy rather than robustness [14].
Robustness has also been studied in more general contexts; [23] studies the connection between
robustness and generalization, [2] establishes theoretical lower bounds on the robustness of linear and
quadratic classifiers, and [4] seeks to improve robustness by promoting resiliance to deleting features
during training. More broadly, robustness has been identified as a desirable property of classifiers
beyond prediction accuracy. Traditional metrics such as (out-of-sample) accuracy, precision, and
recall help users assess prediction accuracy of trained models; our work aims to develop analogous
metrics for assessing robustness.
2 Robustness Metrics
Consider a classifier f : X → L, where X ⊆ Rn is the input space and L = {1, ..., L} are the labels.
We assume that training and test points x ∈ X have distribution D. We first formalize the notion
of robustness at a point, and then describe two statistics to measure robustness. Our two statistics
depend on a parameter , which captures the idea that we only care about robustness below a certain
threshold—we disregard adversarial examples x whose L∞ distance to x∗ is greater than . We use
 = 20 in our experiments on MNIST and CIFAR-10 (on the pixel scale 0-255).
Pointwise robustness. Intuitively, f is robust at x∗ ∈ X if a “small” perturbation to x∗ does not
affect the assigned label. We are interested in perturbations sufficiently small that they do not affect
human classification; an established condition is ‖x− x∗‖∞ ≤  for some parameter . Formally, we
say f is (x∗, )-robust if for every x such that ‖x−x∗‖∞ ≤ , f(x) = f(x∗). Finally, the pointwise
robustness ρ(f,x∗) of f at x∗ is the minimum  for which f fails to be (x∗, )-robust:
ρ(f,x∗)
def
= inf{ ≥ 0 | f is not (x∗, )-robust}. (1)
This definition formalizes the notion of robustness in [5, 6, 21].
Adversarial frequency. Given a parameter , the adversarial frequency
φ(f, )
def
= Prx∗∼D[ρ(f,x∗) ≤ ]
measures how often f fails to be (x∗, )-robust. In other words, if f has high adversarial frequency,
then it fails to be (x∗, )-robust for many inputs x∗.
Adversarial severity. Given a parameter , the adversarial severity
µ(f, )
def
= Ex∗∼D[ρ(f,x∗) | ρ(f,x∗) ≤ ]
measures the severity with which f fails to be robust at x∗ conditioned on f not being (x∗, )-robust.
We condition on pointwise robustness since once f is (x∗, )-robust at x∗, then the degree to which f
is robust at x∗ does not matter. Smaller µ(f, ) corresponds to worse adversarial severity, since f is
more susceptible to adversarial examples if the distances to the nearest adversarial example are small.
The frequency and severity capture different robustness behaviors. A neural net may have high
adversarial frequency but low adversarial severity, indicating that most adversarial examples are
about  distance away from the original point x∗. Conversely, a neural net may have low adversarial
frequency but high adversarial severity, indicating that it is typically robust, but occasionally severely
fails to be robust. Frequency is typically the more important metric, since a neural net with low
adversarial frequency is robust most of the time. Indeed, adversarial frequency corresponds to the
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(a) (b)
Figure 1: Neural net with a single hidden layer and
ReLU activations trained on dataset with binary labels.
(a) The training data and loss surface. (b) The linear
region corresponding to the red training point.
(a) (b) (c)
(d) (e) (f)
Figure 2: For MNIST, (a) an im-
age classified 1, (b) its adversar-
ial example classifed 3, and (c)
the (scaled) adversarial perturba-
tion. For CIFAR-10, (d) an im-
age classified as “automobile”, (e)
its adversarial example classified as
“truck”, and (f) the (scaled) adver-
sarial perturbation.
accuracy on adversarial examples used to measure robustness in [5, 20]. Severity can be used to
differentiate between neural nets with similar adversarial frequency.
Given a set of samples X ⊆ X drawn i.i.d. from D, we can estimate φ(f, ) and µ(f, ) using the
following standard estimators, assuming we can compute ρ:
φˆ(f, ,X)
def
=
|{x∗ ∈ X | ρ(f,x∗) ≤ }|
|X|
µˆ(f, ,X)
def
=
∑
x∗∈X ρ(f,x∗)I[ρ(f,x∗) ≤ ]
|{x∗ ∈ X | ρ(f,x∗) ≤ }| .
An approximation ρˆ(f,x∗) ≈ ρ(f,x∗) of ρ, such as the one we describe in Section 4, can be used in
place of ρ. In practice, X is taken to be the test set Xtest.
3 Computing Pointwise Robustness
3.1 Overview
Consider the training points in Figure 1 (a) colored based on the ground truth label. To classify this
data, we train a two-layer neural net f(x) = argmax`{(W2g(W1x))`}, where the ReLU function g
is applied pointwise. Figure 1 (a) includes contours of the per-point loss function of this neural net.
Exhaustively searching the input space to determine the distance ρ(f,x∗) to the nearest adversarial
example for input x∗ (labeled `∗) is intractable. Recall that neural nets with rectified-linear (ReLU)
units as activations are piecewise linear [15]. Since adversarial examples exist because of this
linearity in the neural net [5], we restrict our search to the region Z(x∗) around x∗ on which the
neural net is linear. This region around x∗ is defined by the activation of the ReLU function: for
each i, if (W1x∗)i ≥ 0 (resp., (W1x∗) ≤ 0), we constrain to the half-space {x | (W1x)i ≥ 0} (resp.,
{x | (W1x)i ≤ 0}). The intersection of these half-spaces is convex, so it admits efficient search.
Figure 1 (b) shows one such convex region 1.
Additionally, x is labeled ` exactly when f(x)` ≥ f(x)`′ for each `′ 6= `. These constraints are linear
since f is linear on Z(x∗). Therefore, we can find the distance to the nearest input with label ` 6= `∗
by minimizing ‖x − x∗‖∞ on Z(x∗). Finally, we can perform this search for each label ` 6= `∗,
though for efficiency we take ` to be the label assigned the second-highest score by f . Figure 1 (b)
shows the adversarial example found by our algorithm in our running example. In Figure 1 note that
the direction of the nearest adversarial example is not necessary aligned with the signed gradient of
the loss function, as observed by others [7].
1Our neural net has 8 hidden units, but for this x∗, 6 of the half-spaces entirely contain the convex region.
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3.2 Formulation as Optimization
We compute ρ(f, ) by expressing (1) as constraints C, which consist of
• Linear relations; specifically, inequalities C ≡ (wTx+ b ≥ 0) and equalities C ≡ (wTx+
b = 0), where x ∈ Rm (for some m) are variables and w ∈ Rm, b ∈ R are constants.
• Conjunctions C ≡ C1 ∧ C2, where C1 and C2 are themselves constraints. Both constraints
must be satisfied for the conjunction to be satisfied.
• Disjunctions C ≡ C1∨C2, where C1 and C2 are themselves constraints. One of the constraints
must be satisfied for the disjunction to be satisfied.
The feasible set F(C) of C is the set of x ∈ Rm that satisfy C; C is satisfiable if F(C) is nonempty.
In the next section, we show that the condition f(x) = ` can be expressed as constraints Cf (x, `);
i.e., f(x) = ` if and only if Cf (x, `) is satisfiable. Then, ρ(f, ) can be computed as follows:
ρ(f,x∗) = min6`=`∗
ρ(f,x∗, `) (2)
ρ(f,x∗, `)
def
= inf{ ≥ 0 | Cf (x, `) ∧ ‖x− x∗‖∞ ≤  satisfiable}. (3)
The optimization problem is typically intractable; we describe a tractable approximation in §4.
3.3 Encoding a Neural Network
We show how to encode the constraint f(x) = ` as constraints Cf (x, `) when f is a neural net. We
assume f has form f(x) = argmax`∈L
{[
f (k)(f (k−1)(...(f (1)(x))...))
]
`
}
, where the ith layer of
the network is a function f (i) : Rni−1 → Rni , with n0 = n and nk = |L|. We describe the encoding
of fully-connected and ReLU layers; convolutional layers are encoded similarly to fully-connected
layers and max-pooling layers are encoded similarly to ReLU layers. We introduce the variables
x(0), . . . ,x(k) into our constraints, with the interpretation that x(i) represents the output vector of
layer i of the network; i.e., x(i) = f (i)(x(i−1)). The constraint Cin(x) ≡ (x(0) = x) encodes the
input layer. For each layer f (i), we encode the computation of x(i) given x(i−1) as a constraint Ci.
Fully-connected layer. In this case, x(i) = f (i)(x(i−1)) = W (i)x(i−1) + b(i), which we encode
using the constraints Ci ≡
∧ni
j=1
{
x
(i)
j =W
(i)
j x
(i−1) + b(i)j
}
, where W (i)j is the j-th row of W
(i).
ReLU layer. In this case, x(i)j = max {x(i−1)j , 0} (for each 1 ≤ j ≤ ni), which we encode using
the constraints Ci ≡
∧ni
j=1 Cij , where Cij = (x(i−1)j <0 ∧ x(i)j =0) ∨ (x(i−1)j ≥ 0 ∧ x(i)j =x(i−1)j ).
Finally, the constraints Cout(`) ≡
∧
`′ 6=`
{
x
(k)
` ≥ x(k)`′
}
ensure that the output label is `. Together,
the constraints Cf (x, `) ≡ Cin(x) ∧
(∧k
i=1 Ci
)
∧ Cout(`) encodes the computation of f :
Theorem 1 For any x ∈ X and ` ∈ L, we have f(x) = ` if and only if Cf (x, `) is satisfiable.
4 Approximate Computation of Pointwise Robustness
Convex restriction. The challenge to solving (3) is the non-convexity of the feasible set of Cf (x, `).
To recover tractability, we approximate (3) by constraining the feasible set to x ∈ Z(x∗), where
Z(x∗) ⊆ X is carefully chosen so that the constraints Cˆf (x, `) ≡ Cf (x, `) ∧ (x ∈ Z(x∗)) have
convex feasible set. We call Cˆf (x, `) the convex restriction of Cf (x, `). In some sense, convex
restriction is the opposite of convex relaxation. Then, we can approximately compute robustness:
ρˆ(f,x∗, `)
def
= inf{ ≥ 0 | Cˆf (x, `) ∧ ‖x− x∗‖∞ ≤  satisfiable}. (4)
The objective is optimized over x ∈ Z(x∗), which approximates the optimum over x ∈ X .
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Choice of Z(x∗). We construct Z(x∗) as the feasible set of constraints D(x∗); i.e., Z(x∗) =
F(D(x∗)). We now describe how to construct D(x∗).
Note that F(wTx+ b = 0) and F(wTx+ b ≥ 0) are convex sets. Furthermore, if F(C1) and F(C2)
are convex, then so is their conjunction F(C1 ∧ C2). However, their disjunction F(C1 ∨ C2) may not
be convex; for example, F((x ≥ 0) ∨ (y ≥ 0)). The potential non-convexity of disjunctions makes
(3) difficult to optimize.
We can eliminate disjunction operations by choosing one of the two disjuncts to hold. For example,
note that for C1 ≡ C2 ∨ C3, we have both F(C2) ⊆ F(C1) and F(C3) ⊆ F(C1). In other words, if we
replace C1 with either C2 or C3, the feasible set of the resulting constraints can only become smaller.
Taking D(x∗) ≡ C2 (resp., D(x∗) ≡ C3) effectively replaces C1 with C2 (resp., C3).
To restrict (3), for every disjunction C1 ≡ C2 ∨C3, we systematically choose either C2 or C3 to replace
the constraint C1. In particular, we choose C2 if x∗ satisfies C2 (i.e., x∗ ∈ F(C2)) and choose C3
otherwise. In our constraints, disjunctions are always mutually exclusive, so x∗ never simultaneously
satisfies both C2 and C3. We then take D(x∗) to be the conjunction of all our choices. The resulting
constraints Cˆf (x, `) contains only conjunctions of linear relations, so its feasible set is convex. In
fact, it can be expressed as a linear program (LP) and can be solved using any standard LP solver.
For example, consider a rectified linear layer (as before, max pooling layers are similar). The original
constraint added for unit j of rectified linear layer f (i) is(
x
(i−1)
j ≤ 0 ∧ x(i)j = 0
)
∨
(
x
(i−1)
j ≥ 0 ∧ x(i)j = x(i−1)j
)
To restrict this constraint, we evaluate the neural network on the seed input x∗ and look at the input
to f (i), which equals x(i−1)∗ = f (i−1)(...(f (1)(x∗))...). Then, for each 1 ≤ j ≤ ni:
D(x∗)← D(x∗) ∧
{
x
(i−1)
j ≤ 0 ∧ x(i)j = x(i−1)j if (x(i−1)∗ )j ≤ 0
x
(i−1)
j ≥ 0 ∧ x(i)j = 0 if (x(i−1)∗ )j > 0.
Iterative constraint solving. We implement an optimization for solving LPs by lazily adding
constraints as necessary. Given all constraints C, we start off solving the LP with the subset of
equality constraints Cˆ ⊆ C, which yields a (possibly infeasible) solution z. If z is feasible, then z is
also an optimal solution to the original LP; otherwise, we add to Cˆ the constraints in C that are not
satisfied by z and repeat the process. This process always yields the correct solution, since in the
worst case Cˆ becomes equal to C. In practice, this optimization is an order of magnitude faster than
directly solving the LP with constraints C.
Single target label. For simplicity, rather than minimize over ρ(f,x∗, `) for each ` 6= `∗, we fix `
to be the second most probable label f˜(x∗); i.e.,
ρˆ(f,x∗)
def
= inf{ ≥ 0 | Cˆf (x, f˜(x∗)) ∧ ‖x− x∗‖∞ ≤  satisfiable}. (5)
Approximate robustness statistics. We can use ρˆ in our statistics φˆ and µˆ defined in §2. Because
ρˆ is an overapproximation of ρ (i.e., ρˆ(f,x∗) ≥ ρ(f,x∗)), the estimates φˆ and µˆ may not be unbiased
(in particular, φˆ(f, ) ≤ φ(f, )). In §6, we show empirically that our algorithm produces substantially
less biased estimates than existing algorithms for finding adversarial examples.
5 Improving Neural Net Robustness
Finding adversarial examples. We can use our algorithm for estimating ρˆ(f,x∗) to compute
adversarial examples. Given x∗, the value of x computed by the optimization procedure used to solve
(5) is an adversarial example for x∗ with ‖x− x∗‖∞ = ρˆ(f,x∗).
Finetuning. We use fine-tuning to reduce a neural net’s susceptability to adversarial examples.
First, we use an algorithm A to compute adversarial examples for each x∗ ∈ Xtrain and add them to
the training set. Then, we continue training the network on a the augmented training set at a reduced
training rate. We can repeat this process multiple rounds (denoted T ); at each round, we only consider
x∗ in the original training set (rather than the augmented training set).
6
Neural Net Accuracy (%) Adversarial Frequency (%) Adversarial Severity (pixels)Baseline Our Algo. Baseline Our Algo.
LeNet (Original) 99.08 1.32 7.15 11.9 12.4
Baseline (T = 1) 99.14 1.02 6.89 11.0 12.3
Baseline (T = 2) 99.15 0.99 6.97 10.9 12.4
Our Algo. (T = 1) 99.17 1.18 5.40 12.8 12.2
Our Algo. (T = 2) 99.23 1.12 5.03 12.2 11.7
Table 1: Evaluation of fine-tuned networks. Our method discovers more adversarial examples than
the baseline [21] for each neural net, hence producing better estimates. LeNet fine-tuned for T = 1, 2
rounds (bottom four rows) exhibit a notable increase in robustness compared to the original LeNet.
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 3: The cumulative number of test points x∗ such that ρ(f,x∗) ≤  as a function of . In (a)
and (b), the neural nets are the original LeNet (black), LeNet fine-tuned with the baseline and T = 2
(red), and LeNet fine-tuned with our algorithm and T = 2 (blue); in (a), ρˆ is measured using the
baseline, and in (b), ρˆ is measured using our algorithm. In (c), the neural nets are the original NiN
(black) and NiN finetuned with our algorithm, and ρˆ is estimated using our algorithm.
Rounding errors. MNIST images are represented as integers, so we must round the perturbation
to obtain an image, which oftentimes results in non-adversarial examples. When fine-tuning, we add
a constraint x(k)` ≥ x(k)`′ + α for all `′ 6= `, which eliminates this problem by ensuring that the neural
net has high confidence on its adversarial examples. In our experiments, we fix α = 3.0.
Similarly, we modified the L-BFGS-B baseline so that during the line search over c, we only count
x∗+r as adversarial if x
(k)
` ≥ x(k)`′ +α for all `′ 6= `. We choose α = 0.15, since larger α causes the
baseline to find significantly fewer adversarial examples, and small α results in smaller improvement
in robustness. With this choice, rounding errors occur on 8.3% of the adversarial examples we find
on the MNIST training set.
6 Experiments
6.1 Adversarial Images for CIFAR-10 and MNIST
We find adversarial examples for the neural net LeNet [12] (modified to use ReLUs instead of
sigmoids) trained to classify MNIST [11], and for the network-in-network (NiN) neural net [13]
trained to classify CIFAR-10 [9]. Both neural nets are trained using Caffe [8]. For MNIST, Figure 2
(b) shows an adversarial example (labeled 1) we find for the image in Figure 2 (a) labeled 3, and
Figure 2 (c) shows the corresponding adversarial perturbation scaled so the difference is visible (it
has L∞ norm 17). For CIFAR-10, Figure 2 (e) shows an adversarial example labeled “truck” for
the image in Figure 2 (d) labeled “automobile”, and Figure 2 (f) shows the corresponding scaled
adversarial perturbation (which has L∞ norm 3).
6.2 Comparison to Other Algorithms on MNIST
We compare our algorithm for estimating ρ to the baseline L-BFGS-B algorithm proposed by [21].
We use the tool provided by [22] to compute this baseline. For both algorithms, we use adversarial
target label ` = f˜(x∗). We use LeNet in our comparisons, since we find that it is substantially more
robust than the neural nets considered in most previous work (including [21]). We also use versions
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of LeNet fine-tuned using both our algorithm and the baseline with T = 1, 2. To focus on the most
severe adversarial examples, we use a stricter threshold for robustness of  = 20 pixels.
We performed a similar comparison to the signed gradient algorithm proposed by [5] (with the signed
gradient multiplied by  = 20 pixels). For LeNet, this algorithm found only one adversarial example
on the MNIST test set (out of 10,000) and four adversarial examples on the MNIST training set (out
of 60,000), so we omit results 2.
Results. In Figure 3, we plot the number of test points x∗ for which ρˆ(f,x∗) ≤ , as a function
of , where ρˆ(f,x∗) is estimated using (a) the baseline and (b) our algorithm. These plots compare
the robustness of each neural network as a function of . In Table 1, we show results evaluating the
robustness of each neural net, including the adversarial frequency and the adversarial severity. The
running time of our algorithm and the baseline algorithm are very similar; in both cases, computing
ρˆ(f,x∗) for a single input x∗ takes about 1.5 seconds. For comparison, without our iterative constraint
solving optimization, our algorithm took more than two minutes to run.
Discussion. For every neural net, our algorithm produces substantially higher estimates of the
adversarial frequency. In other words, our algorithm estimates ρˆ(f,x∗) with substantially better
accuracy compared to the baseline.
According to the baseline metrics shown in Figure 3 (a), the baseline neural net (red) is similarly
robust to our neural net (blue), and both are more robust than the original LeNet (black). Our neural
net is actually more robust than the baseline neural net for smaller values of , whereas the baseline
neural net eventually becomes slightly more robust (i.e., where the red line dips below the blue line).
This behavior is captured by our robustness statistics—the baseline neural net has lower adversarial
frequency (so it has fewer adversarial examples with ρˆ(f,x∗) ≤ ) but also has worse adversarial
severity (since its adversarial examples are on average closer to the original points x∗).
However, according to our metrics shown in Figure 3 (b), our neural net is substantially more robust
than the baseline neural net. Again, this is reflected by our statistics—our neural net has substantially
lower adversarial frequency compared to the baseline neural net, while maintaining similar adversarial
severity. Taken together, our results suggest that the baseline neural net is overfitting to the adversarial
examples found by the baseline algorithm. In particular, the baseline neural net does not learn the
adversarial examples found by our algorithm. On the other hand, our neural net learns both the
adversarial examples found by our algorithm and those found by the baseline algorithm.
6.3 Scaling to CIFAR-10
We also implemented our approach for the for the CIFAR-10 network-in-network (NiN) neural
net [13], which obtains 91.31% test set accuracy. Computing ρˆ(f,x∗) for a single input on NiN
takes about 10-15 seconds on an 8-core CPU. Unlike LeNet, NiN suffers severely from adversarial
examples—we measure a 61.5% adversarial frequency and an adversarial severity of 2.82 pixels. Our
neural net (NiN fine-tuned using our algorithm and T = 1) has test set accuracy 90.35%, which is
similar to the test set accuracy of the original NiN. As can be seen in Figure 3 (c), our neural net
improves slightly in terms of robustness, especially for smaller . As before, these improvements are
reflected in our metrics—the adversarial frequency of our neural net drops slightly to 59.6%, and
the adversarial severity improves to 3.88. Nevertheless, unlike LeNet, our fine-tuned version of NiN
remains very prone to adversarial examples. In this case, we believe that new techniques are required
to significantly improve robustness.
7 Conclusion
We have shown how to formulate, efficiently estimate, and improve the robustness of neural nets
using an encoding of the robustness property as a constraint system. Future work includes devising
better approaches to improving robustness on large neural nets such as NiN and studying properties
beyond robustness.
2Futhermore, the signed gradient algorithm cannot be used to estimate adversarial severity since all the
adversarial examples it finds have L∞ norm .
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